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The crisis of the classical concept of liberal democracy in the context of 
modern challenges 
The main aim of this paper is to examine the problem of the crisis of liberal democracy in the modern world, 
referring to the phenomenon of a loss of balance between social and personal good in a pluralistic society. There are 
several concepts of democracy in political science, including the classic liberal concept, which sees its core priorities 
collide with recent global challenges. Thus, the relevance of this problem refers to the recent disappointment in the 
idea of liberal democracy, which shows disillusionment in democracy as such. In response to this trend, some hybrid 
regimes offer an alternative in the form of so-called democracies with illiberal approaches. From the other side, the 
liberal democratic platforms are used by populist political forces, which results in dividing democratic societies about 
the questions hard to finally solve. The Brexit problem – the process of British exit from the European Union – shows 
recent examples of long-lasting social effects derived from the crisis of liberal democratic concept. The author of the 
article has come to the conclusion that when it comes to modern democratic processes, classic liberal approach brings 
the populism threat back to the table. When there is no balance between the totally free civil society with its direct 
democratic influences and the state structure with formal procedures aimed at total good of beneficial functioning, 
the liberal instruments would be used by populists. Populism can create severe divisions within liberal democratic 
societies providing dilemmas, such as Brexit, which are difficult to solve with the same liberal democratic procedures. 
This means that liberal democratic approach undermines itself with the very fact of the existing tendency to lose 
balance between the ideal personal freedom (that includes satisfying every citizen’s choice) and public good. 
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Криза класичної концепції ліберальної демократії в умовах сучасних 
викликів
Головною метою статті є дослідження проблеми кризи ліберальної демократії в сучасному світі з огляду 
на втрату рівноваги між суспільним  та особистим благом у плюралістичному суспільстві. У політичній науці 
існує кілька концепцій демократії, включаючи класичну ліберальну концепцію, чиї ключові  пріоритети 
стикаються з сучасними глобальними проблемами. Таким чином, актуальність цього дослідження виходить 
з проблеми сучасного розчарування в ідеї ліберальної демократії, що також визначається розчаруванням в 
демократії в цілому. У відповідь на цю тенденцію деякі гібридні режими пропонують альтернативу у вигляді 
так званих демократій з неліберальними підходами. З іншого боку, ліберально-демократичні платформи 
використовуються популістськими політичними силами, що призводить до поділу демократичного суспільства 
з питань, які важко вирішити остаточно. Проблема Brexit - процес виходу Великобританії з Європейського 
Союзу – демонструє новий приклад довготривалих соціальних наслідків, що походять від кризи ліберально-
демократичної концепції. Автор дослідження приходить до висновку, що коли йдеться про сучасні демократичні 
процеси, класичний ліберальний підхід повертає загрозу популізму. Коли немає рівноваги між абсолютно 
вільним громадянським суспільством з його прямими демократичними впливами та державною структурою з 
офіційними процедурами, спрямованими на суспільне благо через успішне управління, ліберальні інструменти 
використовуються популістами. Популізм може створити серйозний розкол в ліберально-демократичних 
суспільствах, який призводить до таких дилем, як Brexit, що важко вирішити за допомогою власне ліберально-
демократичних процедур. Це означає, що ліберально-демократичний підхід підриває сам факт свого існування 
через втрату рівноваги між ідеальною особистою свободою (що включає задоволення вибору кожного 
громадянина) та суспільним благом.
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Introduction
Modern era provides political scientists with a variety of new questions, more complicated than 
ever before. Considering the fact that political 
science already has a number of core problems 
unsolved, 21 century brings more controversies, 
which can confuse a researcher. 
Failing to find mutual theoretic ground for 
defining political regimes, separating types of 
regimes and determining democracy, political 
scientists face a new challenge – a crisis of 
liberal democratic approach. In political science 
there are different views on the problem of 
weakening democracy in the 21th century. 
Among the scientists who research the recent 
democratic and autocratic waves, one can 
name Y. Mounk, A. Applebaum, P. Brooker, A. 
Croissant, B.W. Jentleson, J. Linz, Z. Laub and 
others. But according to their researches the 
question remains unclear, whether it is accurate 
to call the recent state of global democracy a 
downfall or it is more accurate to speak about the 
weakening of a specific concept of democracy, 
namely, the classical liberal democratic model.
The main aim of this particular article is 
to research the core problem of weakening 
liberal democratic concept through the prism of 
modern global challenges, which question the 
balance of public good and personal freedoms 
in liberal democracies. 
I. The problem of liberal democratic 
concept and its definition within the 
framework of modern challenges.
As Y. Mounk puts it, “People have been 
growing more and more critical of our (liberal 
democratic) political system - not just of 
particular governments or institutions but of 
democracy itself - for a long time”. (Laub, 
13) The political theorist underlines that “over 
the last twenty years, antisystem parties and 
movements, especially on the far right, have 
risen around the world”. Moreover, this rise is a 
global trend, which includes the rise of populism, 
affecting almost every liberal democracy 
(Laub, 13). There are modern examples of 
illiberal democratic order (Hungary), which 
pose a threat to liberal norms as “ideological 
competitors”. But there are many examples of 
illiberal attitudes within liberal democracies 
as well. “A turn toward increasingly illiberal 
attitudes pervades countries as different as 
Australia, the United States, Sweden, Germany, 
Greece, Poland, Hungary, Turkey, Russia, India, 
and even China” (Laub, 13).
From Francis Fukuyama’s point of view, 
“everybody now takes democracy for granted”. 
This attitude brings disillusions about the liberal 
democratic institutions both in the United States 
and in Europe (Fukuyama, 5).
The idea of Y. Mounk about the threat for 
liberal democracy includes the thought that 
illiberal democratic orders (which actually 
use non-democratic instruments in democratic 
background) provide an alternative for people 
unhappy with liberal democratic order. “Five 
years ago, I was already worried about people 
falling out of love with democracy. But what 
gave me succour was that there wasn’t a clear 
ideological alternative. Where else were people 
going to go? Very few places in the world were 
going to emulate the Chinese or Iranian models” 
(Laub, 13). Hungary and Russia have created 
an alternative for those who fall between two 
extremes – liberal democracy and autocracy. 
The situation with liberal democratic order 
becomes chaotic around the globe. Bruce 
W. Jentleson argues: “And exactly which 
established democracy can hold itself up as a 
model these days? Even in Scandinavia, often 
depicted as highly tolerant, anti-immigrant 
parties have been running strong. Denmark 
passed a “jewellery law” confiscating personal 
possessions of value from refugee migrants or 
denying them welfare benefits. A party founded 
by former Nazis is part of the new Austrian 
government. A neo-Nazi party won enough votes 
to gain representation in the German Bundestag. 
The Brexit victory was an expression of cultural 
anxiety as well as economic dislocation. Spain 
wrestles with Catalan secession. One could go 
on...” (Jentleson, 10).
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The facts correspond to the idea of liberal 
democracy crisis. Bruce W. Jentleson supposes 
that liberal order has become outdated as the 
manifestation and representation of processes 
that took place globally after the Second World 
War. Being outdated, the liberal democratic 
order seems to fail meeting challenges of the 
21th century. Thus, illiberal political orders 
try to provide an alternative, camouflaging 
and calling it a specific democracy (Parliament 
newspaper of Russian Federation, 14).
This situation also brings competition and 
controversy in the field of political regimes 
typology. Paul Brooker notes that tendency to 
camouflage hybrids and dictatorships “will pose 
a question of how to prevent the 21th century 
from being a century of pseudo-democracies” 
(Brooker, 3). Consequently, in modern times it 
has become more difficult to know what is not 
democracy (Linz, 12).
The same phenomenon brings another 
controversy. Becoming harder to define, 
the concept of democracy provides area 
for manipulation within quasi-democratic 
political systems as well as populists inside 
the democracies. As Juan Linz noted, it’s 
important “to use names for realities that we are 
just attempting to define”. Different political 
actors try to use definitions on behalf of their 
own political systems to “define these systems 
according to what they want these systems to be 
or what they want others to believe” (Linz, 12).
Yet, there is no common ground in 
researching and defining political regimes. The 
definitions and typology depend on the question 
explored (Croissant, 4). There are many 
classic and modern concepts of democracy. 
But liberal democracy isn’t the only point of 
democratic view. When political actors call 
liberal democracy the very manifestation 
of democratic order, there appears to be an 
additional area for manipulation of concepts 
within non-democratic contexts. 
When a researcher fails to define concrete 
alternatives to liberal democratic concept, any 
political actor receives freedom to call non-
democratic system (be it hybrid or autocratic) 
an alternative, though illiberal, democratic order 
(Parliament newspaper of Russian Federation, 
14). Critical attitude towards liberal democracy 
does not necessarily mean disillusions in 
democracy itself. But, while researchers equate 
liberal democracy and democracy in general, 
there is no alternative for transformations of the 
concept.
As A. Lijphart underlines, democratic 
pessimists can face “a danger of self-fulfilling 
prophecy”. If politicians and political scientists 
decide that democracy “doesn’t work” in plural, 
complex societies, these societies will not even 
try to make democracy work. This negative 
approach gives further way to non-democratic 
orders (Lijphart, 11).
II. The legacy of the Hobbes’ problem 
for the liberal democratic concept.
There are different approaches, which tend 
to explain the concept of “democracy”. An 
institutional approach explains democracy 
through the concept of political regime. A 
procedural approach underlines the political 
procedures as a core of democratic order. A 
cultural approach considers the culture of 
any society to be based on basic principles, 
such as individual autonomy, freedom of 
speech, etc. An axiological approach considers 
specific values, such as freedom, equality, 
human rights, etc. They cover most aspects 
of the democratic phenomenon when applied 
together, yet, separately these approaches lose 
common ground to explain the complexity of 
the democratic concept. 
For example, Alain Touraine and Guy Hermet 
underline that any definition of democracy 
is far from being inclusive, and therefore it is 
necessary to distinguish two definitions of this 
phenomenon – a complicated and a realistic one 
(Touraine, 18), (Hermet, 8).
Bernd Guggenberger also points out that the 
concept of democracy does not have a common 
theoretic basis for one definition. Moreover, 
each researcher chooses their own key element, 
the characteristic of the phenomenon to create 
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statements about the nature of the phenomenon, 
as well as the definition of the concept. There are 
following key elements often taken for the basis 
of the democratic concept: equality, complicity, 
power of the majority, constraints on power and 
control, tolerance, fundamental rights of citizens, 
legal and social statehood, separation of powers, 
general elections, transparency, competition of 
interests, pluralism, etc (Guggenberger, 7).
If we take a closer look at the basic theories of 
democracy, we find one common dilemma they 
all try to solve: the balance between interests of 
minority and majority, particularly considering 
issues vital for a state. And here we inevitably 
come to the core problem. If a democratic theory 
is based on the idea of prevailing majority 
interests without taking into account minority 
interests, it loses the basic ground of personal 
freedom value. If a democratic theory takes 
into account minority interests as well as the 
majority ones, it loses the basic idea of taking 
decisions, which correspond to the will of 
“people” in general in the form of “the majority 
rule”. 
This dilemma finally leads to the core 
question: how free can a person be in society, 
especially when it comes to societies based 
on the very idea of personal freedom. This 
problem was particularly represented in works 
of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who 
shared different views on the limits of personal 
freedoms within an artificial “agent” – a state. 
And it still remains to be the central problem for 
every researcher, who tries to work out another 
concept of democracy, either theoretical or 
practical.
Philip Pettit notes in this regard: “Hobbes 
made a distinctive contribution to the discussion 
of freedom on two fronts. He persuaded later, 
if not immediate, successors that it is only 
the exercise of a power of interference that 
reduces people’s freedom, not its (unexercised) 
existence - not even its existence in an arbitrary, 
unchecked form. Equally, he persuaded them 
that the exercise of a power of interference 
always reduces freedom in the same way, 
whether it occurs in a republican democracy, 
purportedly on a ‘non-arbitrary’ basis, or under 
a dictatorial, arbitrary regime” (Pettit, 15).
The problem of power interference and 
freedom limits remains a stumbling stone for 
the democratic concept in general. And here 
appears the difference between a complicated 
definition of democracy and a practical one. The 
complicated definitions work hypothetically 
considering the “ideal” societies. The practical 
ones have to deal with multicomponent 
societies, complex elites and chaotic social 
hierarchy with profound differences in interests 
and views, sometimes unable to negotiate. So, 
when it comes to modern practice, democracy 
seems to be unstable and unpredictable.
In this respect, Arend Lijphart points out that 
it is hard enough to maintain stable democracy 
in modern plural societies. This idea goes back 
to Aristotle’s words about a state, which aims 
to become a society of equals. Sustainable 
democracy is fuelled by social homogeneity 
and political consensus. Otherwise, deep social 
differences and political contradictions become 
a deterrent point for democratic regime and 
may lead to its failure. Multicomponent society 
naturally represents a complex of contradictions 
and differences. Arend Lijphart supposes that it 
is possible to build sustainable democracy in 
plural society by introducing a specific form 
of democracy (consociationalism) based on 
the cooperation of elites within firmly defined 
lines of group interests. This factor is designed 
to smooth deep contradictions and reconcile 
different interests in complex society (Lijphart, 
11).
But here we make a turn back to the Hobbes’ 
problem. Profound differences mean there’s 
no easy way to get peaceful consensus on the 
vital matters. In this case, if one wins, the other 
loses, if the majority takes crucial decision, for 
instance, in a referendum, the minority (in some 
cases almost half of the population, who lost the 
majority vote) will inevitably lose. For instance, 
the referendum in Great Britain about the future 
of participation in the European Union (so called 
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Brexit) represents this dilemma. The practical 
way to solve the problem is either to avoid 
questions in the field of profound differences 
or to use strict “majority decision” principle, 
with little regard towards minority interests. 
The Brexit situation shows that in some cases 
liberal approach doesn’t work simply because 
Hobbes’ problem remains unsolved. Yet, it 
doesn’t necessarily mean democracy fails.
III. Brexit as a specific representation of 
the modern liberal democratic problem.
The Brexit referendum has divided British 
population almost in half: 51.9% voted to leave 
European Union, 48.1% preferred Britain to 
remain in the European community. The same 
strong division was visible within regional 
and age parameters. The voters aged 18-44 in 
majority preferred to stay in the EU, while 44-
65+ in majority preferred to leave. Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and London in majority 
preferred to vote in favour of the EU, while the 
rest of the country voted in favour of leaving. 
(BBC, 2) These results showed deep divisions 
in society's interests. 
There was a poll conducted by Greenberg 
Quinlan Rosner after the referendum, it pointed 
out that while 94% of Remain voters felt they 
had voted the right way, so did the 92% of 
Leave supporters (Greenberg Quinlan Rosner 
Research, 6). The same research showed that 
the country was divided in half in “forced 
choice between liberal and socially conservative 
position”. In polarization this high it seemed 
hard to find consensus on the key questions. For 
instance, the Leave and Remain voters thought 
reducing immigration was essential for the 
country’s future. But when it came to market 
access or free movement, there were profound 
differences in Leave and Stay views (Greenberg 
Quinlan Rosner Research, 6).
According to the British Treasury, there were 
three scenarios of economic cooperation with 
the EU: membership of the European Economic 
Area (EEA) like Norway; a negotiated bilateral 
agreement, such as that between the EU and 
Switzerland, Turkey or Canada; World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) membership without 
any form of specific agreement with the EU 
like Russia or Brazil (HM Treasury of UK, 9). 
The first scenario (Norwegian) supposes Great 
Britain remains to be a part of the European 
economic area with market access and a range 
of rules from Brussels. The second (Swiss or 
Canadian) scenario supposes Great Britain 
signs a bilateral agreement with the EU. The 
third scenario (WTO) supposes no special 
agreements with the EU at all. Norwegian 
scenario could satisfy Remain voters, but not 
those who had voted to Leave. Both Canadian 
and WTO scenarios satisfied only those who 
had voted to Leave. 
In this case of three prevailing scenarios 
no decision could become a consensus. If the 
government satisfied minority interests (in 
practice – 48.1% of voters), this logically would 
suppose breaking the “majority rule” principle. 
But if the government used strict “majority 
rule” principle, 48.1% of voters could find their 
interests disregarded. Finally, if the government 
rejected the results of the referendum, it could 
break the core democratic principle of people’s 
decision. 
The 2019 brought light to this dilemma 
with the General Elections, which resulted 
in Conservatives’ victory. This victory 
automatically meant the Leave party held its 
positions and secured a specific way out of the 
Brexit democratic dilemma. Thus, the British 
Parliament notes: “The 2019 General Election 
resulted in a Conservative victory. The party 
won 365 seats, 48 more than in 2017 and 43.6% 
of the vote, up from 42.3% in 2017. The Labour 
Party won 202 seats and 32.1% of the vote, 
down from 262 seats and 40.0% of the vote in 
2017. The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats, one 
fewer than in 2017, and 11.5% of the vote, up 
from 7.4%. The Scottish National Party won 48 
seats, up 13 seats compared with 2017. Plaid 
Cymru retained its 4 seats in Wales. In Northern 
Ireland, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
won 8 seats, two fewer than in 2017, while Sinn 
Féin won 7, the same number” (Sturge, 17).
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The General Elections solved the dilemma by 
providing another direct democratic instrument 
of civil decision-making without breaking or 
reversing the previous one. «Brexit was the 
third most important reason for people when 
choosing to vote for a particular party. Among 
those who voted Conservative, it was the most 
important reason. For Liberal Democrat voters 
it was third. Among Labour and SNP voters, 
it did not feature in the top three reasons. For 
these voters, Brexit was displaced by: trust in 
the party; preferring the promises made; and 
believing the party would improve the running 
of the economy.
Brexit was an important reason for people 
to vote for a particular party. But the polling 
also suggests that it was not necessarily the 
determining factor. In most cases, people would 
have been as keen to vote for their party of choice 
even if Brexit were not an issue. The majority 
of Conservative voters (79%) stated that they 
probably would have voted for the same party, 
even if Brexit had not been an issue. The figure 
was 84% among Labour voters, 87% among 
SNP voters and 62% among Liberal Democrat 
voters» [Sturge, 17].
This resulted in the UK's EU withdrawal 
on January 23, 2020 when this decision finally 
became a law. On January 31, the United 
Kingdom officially left the EU. The very fact of 
civil decision-making through General Elections 
solved the tension inside the Parliament, which 
helped to pass the bill relatively easily compared 
to the pre-election process. 
But the 2021 polls show that though 
technically the dilemma has been solved, the 
civil discontent and tension remain, dividing 
British society evenly. According to the Statista 
poll data “as of March 4, 2021, 45% of people in 
Great Britain thought that it was wrong to leave 
the European Union, compared with 41% who 
thought it was the right decision” (Statista, 16).
According to the Statista, Brexit remains 
among the top questions the British society is 
worried about: “At the height of concern over 
Brexit in September 2019, around 71 percent 
of British adults thought it was one of the main 
issues facing the country. While it remained an 
important issue, it is clear that following the UK's 
official exit from the European Union on January 
31, 2020, that it receded to the background, 
especially after the arrival of the Coronavirus 
pandemic. Towards the end of 2020 however, 
the issue started to grow in importance, due to 
the difficult trade negotiations between the UK 
and the EU, which almost broke down at the 
last minute” (Statista, 16).
This dilemma is the modern manifestation 
of troubles which undermine the classic liberal 
democratic approach. As Aristotle writes in “The 
Politics”, only an individual is indivisible, but a 
state is something made of plural phenomena. 
Egoism is natural - thinks Aristotle - and a state 
cannot be generalized to create an abstract unity. 
There’s nothing wrong in human egoism when 
it is limited to a certain measure (Aristotle, 1).
Aristotle thought that monarchy, aristocracy 
and politeia were the best forms of governing. 
Among these three, politeia represented an 
ideal fusion of two bad forms  -  oligarchy and 
democracy. In the case of government decay 
politeia turns to democracy - thought Aristotle 
- which turns to ochlocracy (power of crowd). 
This cycle is based on the balance of majority and 
minority interests. Losing governing balance 
for the sake of crowd interests, influenced by 
populists, turns politeia into a crowd rule for the 
sake of manipulating minority. 
Conclusions
When it comes to modern democratic 
processes, classic liberal approach brings the 
populism threat back to the table. When there 
is no balance between the totally free civil 
society with its direct democratic influences 
and the state structure with formal procedures 
aimed at total good of beneficial functioning, 
the liberal instruments would be used by 
populists. Populism can create severe divisions 
within liberal democratic societies providing 
dilemmas, such as Brexit, which are difficult 
to solve with the same liberal democratic 
procedures. This means that liberal democratic 
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approach undermines itself with the very fact of 
the existing tendency to lose balance between the 
ideal personal freedom (that includes satisfying 
everybody’s decision) and public good. 
Modern challenges – populism, rise of 
illiberal political regimes, autocratisation, anti-
liberal movement, eurosceptisism, crisis of 
classic democratic values put liberal democracy 
in the position, when it should deconstruct its 
ability to balance between public good and 
personal freedoms. 
The Hobbes problem, the so-called problem 
of order, somehow brings modern democracies 
back to the question of to what extent the state 
restricts the activities of individual, completely 
rational actors pursuing their goals. If the goals 
of individual actors, including all citizens of the 
state, are fundamentally different, but the liberal 
concept is pushed to its limit, proclaiming the 
absolute priority of the personal over the public, 
the state will have a number of problems, which 
are described above.
First, the struggle of personal freedoms 
inevitably leads to the fact that the general level 
of freedom in society decreases, following the 
example of how the absolute freedom of one 
actor leads to the lack of freedom of another.
Secondly, the struggle of personal freedoms 
becomes the basis for the flourishing of populist 
political forces. On the example of the situation 
with Britain's exit from the European Union, one 
can observe how a direct democratic instrument 
(referendum) in the hands of populist forces can 
lead to a deep split within society. Such a split 
exacerbates the problem of the effectiveness of 
democratic instruments' use in a liberal context, 
when agreement with the majority opinion is 
assumed while taking into account the interests 
of the minority.
Thirdly, the social struggle of absolute 
freedoms, which causes a crisis of the liberal-
democratic concept and calls into question the 
effectiveness of this concept in practice, leads 
to the active promotion of quasi-democratic 
concepts. Such concepts are understood as 
the concept proposed by hybrid or autocratic 
political regimes, where an undemocratic 
system of government is “sold” under the 
appearance of an effective model of democracy.
Based on the above challenges, it is necessary 
to revise the liberal-democratic concept taking 
into account the balance of public good and 
personal freedom, bringing personal freedom 
from the absolute to the balance with the 
public good. Finding new balance and practical 
form of consensus within highly divided, 
individualistic postmodern society is a matter 
of democratic survival. Democratic disillusions 
do not threaten liberal reality more than the 
lost balance between general governmental 
stability and personal freedoms. Solving this 
dilemma means finding new ways of bringing 
democratic theory to practice in the face of 
possible autocracy promotion around the globe.
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